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ABSTRACT 
The European Union’s competition policy and legal regime is instrumental in the functioning of the single market 
in the EU. The member states accepted to transfer decision-making power to the European Commission to allow 
for effective enforcement of competition law, crucial for the well-functioning of the Single Market. In contrast, 
there is not yet a region-wide ASEAN competition legal regime and the policy landscape in ASEAN is quite 
different from that of the EU. However, ASEAN in moving towards an ASEAN Economic Community, have 
acknowledged the need to introduce nation-wide competition law and policy by 2015 in its Economic Blueprint. 
One of the objectives of the ASEAN Economic Community is to create a competitive economic region which 
promotes a culture of fair competition. Nevertheless, there are fears that without reforms in the institutional 
arrangements on compliance and enforcement of rules and regulations, the developments in the field of 
competition law will remain words, without any teeth.  
 
This working paper aims at analysing whether EU competition law could serve as a template for ASEAN. It argues 
that ASEAN can look at the EU experience and use the EU competition law regime as a source or reference for 
developing its own model of competition policy and legal instruments. However the development of ASEAN’s 
own competition regime will not follow exactly the roadmap of the EU due to the different approaches towards 
regional economic integration, legislative frameworks and institutional structures. The paper also examines 
possible lessons from EU competition law regime and the most appropriate solutions for a successful ASEAN 
competition law regime. 




EU COMPETITION LAW: A ROADMAP FOR ASEAN? 
BARBORA VALOCKOVA 1 
 
1. Introduction 
“I think we will have an ASEAN Community by the 
end of the year. What the quality is depends on 
how hard we work. There are outstanding things to 
be done. The more we can do the better 
community we will have.” 
Singapore Prime Minister, Mr Lee Hsien Loong, 
June 20152 
The ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) is expected 
to be implemented by the end of this year and its 
objective is to create a competitive region which 
promotes a culture of fair competition. Thus, in the 
AEC blueprint, the ASEAN Member States (AMS)3 
have decided to introduce nation-wide 
competition law and policy in 2015. However, 
there are fears that without reforms of 
institutional and enforcement arrangements in  
ASEAN the developments in the field of 
competition law will remain words, without any 
teeth. The EU Member States (MS) allowed the 
European Commission (EC) to enforce competition 
law, with investigative powers, and with the 
possibility to override the decisions of national 
authorities. Are AMS prepared to follow the EU 
example, adopt a hard law approach and extend 
the enforcement and investigative powers to a 
                                                        
1 Intern, EU Centre in Singapore. The author would like to 
thank Dr Yeo Lay Hwee for her comments on the paper. The 
views expressed in this working paper are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the EU 
Centre in Singapore. Any shortcomings or errors are solely 
the author’s.   




3  Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam 
central entity which would be able to punish 
possible transgressions across ASEAN? 
For the purpose of this paper, competition law is 
understood as a major component of competition 
policy. Competition law includes rules, “legislation, 
judicial decisions and regulations specifically aimed 
at preventing anti-competitive business practices, 
abuse of market power and anti-competitive 
mergers.”4 Competition policy is a broader concept 
consisting of various measures and instruments 
that governments may pursue in order to promote 
and protect competition.5 
EU competition law and policy have always played 
an important role in the progression towards a 
single market in the EU. The latter is often 
considered to be the world’s most successful 
example of regional economic integration6 and the 
Directorate-General for Competition (DG 
Competition) of the EC is considered as one of the 
most sophisticated antitrust enforcers in the 
world. When it comes to ASEAN, as in many of its 
policy areas, the competition law and policy 
landscape is still inconsistent. However, by 
adopting the EU lexicon of creating an ASEAN 
Economic Community, expectations have been 
raised. Some businesses may be hoping that in the 
area of trade and investments, ASEAN will move 
closer to the EU model. The EU experience 
suggests that new mechanisms and institutions are 
instrumental as regional integration deepens. 
Since the EU competition law regime is such an 
integral part of the EU’s single market, could it 
serve as a template for ASEAN as it pursues greater 
                                                        
4  Article 2.1.1.2 of ASEAN Regional Guidelines on 
Competition Policy (2010) 
5  For instance, deregulation and efforts to privatize 
state-owned enterprises 
6  This underlying assumption has been questioned in 
the context of the European sovereign debt crisis, and the 
refugee and migrant crisis. Some academics even argue that 
not only has the EU failed to manage these crises but it has 
become part of the problem (Borzel, 2015). 




economic integration with the inauguration of the 
ASEAN Economic Community? 
This paper argues that ASEAN can learn from the 
EU experience and use the EU competition law 
regime as a source or reference for developing its 
own model of competition policy and legal 
instruments. However the development of 
ASEAN’s own competition regime will not follow 
exactly the roadmap of the EU due to several 
factors which will be subsequently discussed. 
The paper first analyses the different regional 
impulses leading to different approaches towards 
regional economic integration and competition 
law. The second part studies their legislative 
frameworks and the third part focuses on their 
institutional structures. The paper concludes with 
a discussion on possible lessons from the EU and 
the most appropriate solutions for a successful 
ASEAN competition law regime. 
 
1. Two different contexts 
a. EU Competition Law 
i. Historical Context 
The European competition law was formulated and 
put into effect in the 1960s with the adoption of 
regulation 17/62. 7  In the beginning, the first 
function of competition law within the framework 
of the Treaty of Rome 1957 was that of 
integration, because it was envisaged as a tool to 
achieve the common market and to enhance the 
fundamental principle of free movement which 
underpinned the European Community. 
Subsequently, the Single European Act 1986 and 
the progress towards the single market opened up 
competition in new markets, in particular, the 
service markets monopolized by State-owned 
                                                        
7  Council Regulation (EEC) No. 17/62 of 6 February 
1962: First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 (now 
101 and 102) of the Treaty 
enterprises.8 This gave rise to a second function of 
European competition law, that of regulation. As a 
consequence, EU competition law was one of the 
earliest supranational policies in the European 
Community, along with the common agricultural 
and cohesion policies. 
 
ii. Goals of EU Competition Law 
Even though the debate is not fully settled when it 
comes to the goals of EU competition law, authors 
have mostly discussed four of them: fairness, 
economic freedom (plurality and consumer 
choice), economic efficiency and consumer welfare 
(Geradin et al., 2012). There are two dimensions to 
the goal of fairness: first, to whom an undertaking 
must be ‘fair’ and secondly, what makes the 
conduct ‘fair’ or ‘unfair’. It affirms the ordoliberal 
view that rules of the competitive ‘game’ should 
be the same for all undertakings. This is put in 
place when the European Commission decides that 
a firm in a dominant position has to share its 
intellectual property rights or to increase its prices 
in order to assist the entry of its competitors. 
Economic freedom refers to the idea that market 
players must be free to operate on the market 
because, as emphasized by the ‘Harvard School’ in 
the 1950s, the less concentrated a market, the 
better the price and choices for the consumer. 
Finally, it is understood that enhancing economic 
efficiency will ultimately also promote consumer 
welfare which is referred to in numerous 
Commission documents as the ultimate goal of EU 
competition law. 
From a broader perspective, these goals stem from 
the purpose to establish a single market with a 
free flow of goods, labor, services and capital and 
to create “an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe”.9 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
                                                        
8  Such as telecommunications and energy 
9  Preamble of the Treaty of Rome (1957) 




affirmed in 1999 that the Article in the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community (TEEC) 
ensuring that competition is unrestrained is “a 
fundamental provision […] essential for the 
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the 
Community and, in particular, for the functioning 
of the internal market”.10 Due to this relation of 
the competition policy with the original goals of 
the European Community, EU competition law is 
mainly a public policy tool to achieve the goals of 
the EU, and competition policy is considered to be 
one of the most fundamental policies underlying 
the European integration. 
b. Towards an ASEAN competition legal 
regime? 
i. Differences between the EU and ASEAN 
In considering realistically what ASEAN can learn 
from the EU, there is need to be fully aware of the 
differences between the two entities. First and 
foremost, while ASEAN is a region comprising a 
large maritime territory and states very protective 
                                                        
10  Eco Swiss China Time Ltd v. Benetton International 
NV, Judgment of the Court, 1 June 1999, Case C-126/97, 
[2000] 5 C.M.L.R. 816 at para. 36 (emphasis added) 
of their sovereignty, the EU constitutes a 
contiguous land mass with a long coastline, more 
homogeneous (in terms of socio-economic 
environment and political and legal structures). 
The different geography and historical contexts 
impact the approaches taken towards regionalism 
by Southeast Asian and European states.    
Both the EU and ASEAN are also at very different 
stages of economic development.  ASEAN is a small 
economy compared to the EU. The graph below 
shows that in 2012, ASEAN’s nominal GDP (in PPP 
dollars) amounted to 3.6 trillion Dollars which is 20 
percent of EU’s nominal GDP (in PPP dollars) that 
amounted to 18.183 trillion Dollars. But in real 
terms, ASEAN’s GDP growth at 5.7 percent was 
second to China’s 7.8 percent. This has an impact 
on their respective regional integration and 
renders ASEAN more outward-looking which is 
illustrated by the fact that intra-ASEAN trade 
accounts for only about 1/4 of its global trade 
compared to 2/3 in the case of the EU.  
 
Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in billion PPP* Dollars and rate of 
change of real GDP, 2012 
Note: Size of bubble indicates level of GDP in current 
international (PPP) billion dollars while bubble 
position plots the growth rate of real GDP 
 
* Purchasing Power Parity 
ANZ= Australia New Zealand, ROK= Republic of Korea 
 
Source: ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook 2013 




Second, EU and ASEAN represent different models 
of regional cooperation. Yeo (2015) asserts that 
ASEAN is a classical realist type of 
intergovernmental regional organization, founded 
in 1967 around the idea of autonomy and regional 
cooperation, not integration. The word 
‘integration’ was not mentioned in any of the key 
ASEAN documents before 1992. There are no 
supranational institutions within ASEAN, but 
occasionally the AMS do pool their sovereignties 
when national and regional interests converged in 
order to speak with one common voice to confront 
a common threat. Regionalism in ASEAN was 
conceived to support national development and 
not to tame sovereignty.  It was after the Asian 
financial crisis of 1998 that ASEAN in coping with 
the reality of economic interdependence started to 
talk about being more institutionalized. It was in 
2003 that the idea of creating an ASEAN 
Community was formally adopted in the Bali 
Concord II.  
On the other hand, the EU was built with the aim 
of ending the frequent wars between neighbors, 
and was seen first and foremost as a peace project. 
As of 1952, the European Coal and Steel 
Community began to unite European countries 
economically and politically in order to secure 
lasting peace. In 1957, the Treaty of Rome created 
the European Economic Community (EEC) with the 
goals of achieving customs union and common 
market. In 1993, the single market was completed 
with the 'four freedoms' of movement of goods, 
services, people and capital. Subsequently, the EU 
became a monetary union but without fiscal policy. 
The Treaty of Lisbon which came into force on 1 
December 2009 provided the EU with modern 
institutions and more efficient working methods.  
The differences in the subjective environments 
facing the EEC in the 1950s and ASEAN today were 
extensively discussed by Plummer (2009). He 
argues that nation-state formation in ASEAN is 
much younger than was the case in the EEC, and 
that it is therefore still a strong priority in some 
AMS. He further emphasizes that the international 
economic environment is much different today 
than it was in the 1950s as the current global 
marketplace is now extremely open. Thus, the 
underlying need to create AEC was due to different 
reasons than the creation of the EEC (Plummer, 
2009). 
Moreover, in terms of economic development, 
ASEAN encompasses greater diversity.11 Singapore 
is considered a more developed economy, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are somewhere 
in the middle, Cambodia and Laos are less 
developed economies and Vietnam and Myanmar 
are transitional economies. Regarding their 
economic structures, Brunei is a small, rich, oil 
country, Singapore is a commercial economy, 
Malaysia is an industrial/commercial economy but 
enriched with natural resources and Thailand, 
Indonesia and Philippines are mixed 
agricultural/industrial/commercial economies 
(Thanadsillapakul, 2010). Diversity also exists when 
it comes to AMS' political regimes.12 
As a consequence, it was not so much the goal to 
pursue regional integration, but to strengthen 
regional cooperation. ASEAN is too diverse to have 
a structured approach to regionalism like the EU. 
AMS are little inclined to compromise their 
independence by pooling sovereignty with their 
neighbors, not least because several Southeast 
Asian nation states have only recently emerged 
                                                        
11  Even with the latest EU enlargements (in 2004 
including 10 Central and Eastern European countries, in 2007 
including Romania and Bulgaria and in 2013 including 
Croatia) the EU is much less diverse than ASEAN. 
12  Myanmar government just signed a cease-fire 
agreement with representatives of 16 armed ethnic groups in 
March 2015 aiming at ending decades of violent clashes. Laos 
and Vietnam are communist states and Thailand just 
emerged from a political crisis. Moreover, several AMSs will 
hold elections in 2016 which might alternate their position 
towards ASEAN. 




from colonialism and hence the need to focus on 
nation-building. Therefore, in Southeast Asia, 
regional economic integration has been shaped 
more by market forces than by governments.  
Another major difference between the ASEAN and 
the EU is the ‘open regionalism’ approach taken by 
ASEAN in view of its orientation and dependence 
on the global market. 
 
ii. Why AEC is not the EU single market 
The above-mentioned differences between the EU 
and ASEAN have shaped a different approach 
towards a single market. A theoretical definition of 
a single market comprises several criteria. First, 
removal of barriers at the border, beyond the 
border, and across borders to create a genuine 
Free Trade Area (FTA). To pass the test of a single 
market, i.e. one price across countries, fiscal and 
monetary union would also be necessary. Fiscal 
union would remove price distortions arising from 
application of unequal tax rates and monetary 
union would eliminate any cost of foreign 
exchange transactions (Reyes, 2004). 
Following this strict definition, the EU still has not 
fulfilled all these criteria as it does not currently 
have a fiscal union. The Single European Act 
defines the single market as "an area without 
internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in 
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty" 
(Article 8A). This is commonly known as the Four 
Freedoms embodied in the Single Market of the 
EU. 
As regards ASEAN, the key goals of the AEC are 
creating (i) a single market and production base, 
(ii) a highly competitive economic region, (iii) a 
region of equitable economic development, and 
(iv) a region fully integrated into the global 
economy.13 However, there is no evidence that 
there is any political desire by ASEAN leaders to 
establish an EU-style single market. ASEAN leaders 
have agreed on the formation of the AEC as a 
single market but not to the extent of forming a 
fiscal and monetary union, and is not even a 
customs union. In fact, national external trade 
policies are to be coordinated rather than replaced 
by a customs union. Thus, in ASEAN, a single 
market and production base, with free (or rather 
freer) movement of goods, services, capital and 
skilled labor includes the following measures: 
eliminating intra-ASEAN tariffs and non-tariff 
barriers, establishing an 'ASEAN Single Window' as 
a single point of contact for intra-ASEAN customs 
clearance procedures, harmonizing technical 
standards, and introducing mutual recognition of 
professional qualifications in certain sectors rather 
than general labor mobility. 
Therefore, ASEAN is not aiming at an EU-style 
single market but rather at an ‘FTA plus’ or a 
‘common market minus’ arrangement. The ‘FTA 
plus’ approach would envisage a zero-tariff ASEAN 
FTA and some elements of a common market, such 
as freer movement of capital and skilled labor. The 
‘common market minus’ approach would aim at a 
fully integrated market which nevertheless allows 
members states to reserve deeper integration for a 
later stage.  
Furthermore, in contrast to the founding fathers of 
the EEC, ASEAN leaders do not consider the AEC as 
a stepping stone to closer political integration, 
even though economic cooperation may “spill 
over” into other policy areas. In addition, both the 
AEC and the ASEAN Charter provide neither for 
supranational institutions nor for enough 
resources to support an EU-style single market. 
Finally, according to Kimura (2013), a single market 
in ASEAN’s case cannot be literally achieved until 
                                                        
13 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (2008) 




geographical and industrial development gaps are 
filled. He therefore argues that achieving 
‘integrated production base’ must be prioritized in 
the AEC, as it can effectively help to narrow the 
development gaps. 
  
iii. Why ASEAN needs competition law?  
While ASEAN is not aiming for an EU-style Single 
Market, it has signaled the intent to deepen 
economic integration in the region as a way to 
boost the region’s competitiveness. Thus, there is 
also increased expectation for ASEAN to create 
conducive conditions for trade and investments. 
Having a transparent competition legal regime can 
support the implementation and elaboration of 
trade and investment liberalization within the 
ASEAN market.  
The characterization of the AEC implies that 
competition law is necessary to maintain a 
competitive environment within the region. This 
objective is very similar to that associated with 
competition law and policy in the EU. It aims at 
reducing market barriers, discouraging anti-
competitive behaviour, benefiting both the 
consumers and local small to medium enterprises 
(SMEs) within ASEAN, and therefore facilitating 
regional integration and creation of a single 
market.  
However, in the case of ASEAN, there is a third 
objective of competition law. ASEAN economic 
regionalism is a response by the Southeast Asian 
governments to a fear of marginalization from 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Nesadurai, 2005). 
The attractiveness of ASEAN as a destination for 
FDI saw a drop in the immediate aftermath of the 
Asian financial crisis. The rise of China has led to a 
rush of foreign investments into China, many at 
the expense of ASEAN. It was only at the beginning 
of the second decade of the 21st century that FDI 
into ASEAN is starting to catch up with China, and 
in 2013, ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) attracted 
more FDI than China ($128 billion versus $117 
billion).14 
Since a stable competition regime is important in 
order to attract investors, the need for regional 
competition law is acknowledged.  As the Prime 
Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong put it at 
the 25th ASEAN Summit in Myanmar in 2014: "an 
ASEAN that is economically integrated, strong and 
united can better attract investments, create jobs, 
manage regional challenges, as well as be an 
effective platform to engage larger powers".  
Furthermore, given ASEAN’s ‘open regionalism’ 
which aims for the least discriminatory impact on 
non-members, ASEAN regional competition law 
and policy is important for the promotion of a 
proper competitive balance between intra- and 
extra-ASEAN business enterprises.  
 
2. Diverging legislative frameworks 
a. EU’s choice: hard law 
EU opted for supranational competition rules 
because of its institutional set-up emphasizing 
integration. They are enshrined in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) with 
a major aim of speeding up market integration. 
The TFEU is complemented by a number of 
regulations and directives intended to be followed 
by all MS. The EU has exclusive competence in the 
establishment “of the competition rules necessary 
for the functioning of the internal market” (Art. 3 
TFEU). Nevertheless, at the same time MS have 
separate and distinct national competition laws 
and national competition authorities which may 
converge on some points and diverge on others. 
                                                        
14  Source: McKinsey 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/public_sector/understan
ding_asean_seven_things_you_need_to_know 




EU competition law consists of two main 
provisions namely controlling anti-competitive 
practices arising from restrictive agreements 
(Article 101 TFEU) and preventing the abuse of a 
dominant position (Article 102 TFEU). Article 107 
of the TFEU deals with state aid and stipulates that 
aid distorting competition should not be attributed 
by the government of MS to businesses. Control of 
mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures is covered 
by Regulation 139/2004. A principle of particular 
importance in the field of competition law is the 
non-discrimination principle contained in Article 18 
TFEU prohibiting discriminations on grounds of 
nationality.  
In addition, EU competition rules uphold the 
doctrines of direct effect and supremacy. The 
principle of direct effect was established by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Van Gend en 
Loos15 and entails that EU provisions can create 
rights which EU citizens may rely on before their 
domestic courts. According to the doctrine of 
supremacy, when there is conflict between 
European law and national law, European law 
prevails.  This has been affirmed by the ECJ in 
several decisions.16 
The EC also issues guidelines and notices which are 
not binding but explain the scope and application 
of the different Articles and Regulations. As a 
result of Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 (the so-called 
‘modernization regulation’, effective 1 May 2004), 
national competition rules must be applied in 
tandem with Community rules which makes EU 
competition law not only uniform at the EU level, 
but also at national level (Luu, 2012; Jones, 2006).  
In consequence, EU competition law is a complex 
and comprehensive set of rules bringing a high 
                                                        
15  Case 26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie 
Onderneming van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie 
der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 
16  See Costa v. ENEL, Simmenthal II and Marleasing 
degree of convergence of competition laws across 
the EU.  
 
b. ASEAN’s choice: soft law 
Contrary to the EU, and expectedly, ASEAN has 
chosen a soft law approach to competition. The 
latter has been promoted by ASEAN Experts Group 
on Competition (AEGC) which is a regional forum 
established in 2007 to discuss and co-operate on 
competition law and policy. It has developed the 
ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy 
(2010) and compiled a Handbook on Competition 
Policy and Law in ASEAN Member states for 
Business (launched in 2010 and updated in 2013). 
It has also drafted Guidelines on Developing Core 
Competencies in Competition Policy and Law for 
ASEAN (2012), based on the experiences of AMSs 
and internationally recommended practices. 
By providing a general framework, these guidelines 
promote cooperation, the sharing of best practices 
among the AMS, and the creation of a competition 
law culture. Their effectiveness has been 
questioned by many. According to Carol Osborne 
(Economist, Partner, HoustonKemp, Singapore, 
2015), “the guidelines may be part of the process 
of drafting political and legal decisions on 
competition issues in the ASEAN countries, but it is 
difficult to expect them to be an efficient tool for 
economic integration of the less developed ASEAN 
countries”. 
To date, nine of ten AMS have comprehensive 
national competition laws. Cambodia is the only 
one out.  Most recently, the Philippine 
Competition Act was signed into law on 21 July 
2015 and the Laos Business Competition Law was 
passed on 16 July 2015. The competition laws of 
AMS originate from different stimuli. Both 
Indonesia and Thailand have implemented and 
enforced competition law since 1999 as they were 
urged by IMF to reform their economic and legal 




systems during the Asian financial crisis. In 
Vietnam, the implementation of competition law 
was accelerated by the accession to WTO and in 
Singapore, enforcement of competition law stems 
from legal obligations set out in the US-Singapore 
FTA (2003).  
Laws adopted by the nine AMS have similar 
objectives in that they all prohibit anti-competitive 
agreements in the private sector and abuse of 
dominance. However, variations remain, especially 
in terms of threshold levels and sanctions.17 These 
differences may have implications on transaction 
costs and cross-border investments.  
A unique regional competition law seems too 
ambitious a goal for ASEAN for the time being, not 
only because of legal differences in the AMS but 
also given the disparities in size, 18  economic 
weight, and level of industrialization among AMS. 
This diversity of economic structures within ASEAN 
has an impact on the competition regime in each 
AMS. Therefore, it would be difficult to implement 
competition law through EU style hard approach 
until national economies are more evenly 
developed. The guidelines also expressly state that 
the implementation of competition policy should 
not prevent AMS from “pursuing other legitimate 
policies that may require derogations from 
competition policy principles” (Art. 3.5.1). As a 
consequence, AMS may adopt exemptions or 
                                                        
17  Concerning penalties, some AMSs apply criminal 
sanctions (such as Thailand), some only apply administrative 
sanctions (such as Singapore), and some combine both types 
of sanctions (such as Indonesia). AMSs also chose different 
thresholds for merger notification and the latter is voluntary 
in Singapore. 
18  The implementation of competition law in some 
AMSs such as Brunei, Cambodia and Lao PDR needs to take 
into account their small size as it is difficult to achieve scale 
economies in small market economies which also tend to be 
dominated by a few large firms. In practice, these AMSs may 
opt for merger controls that are more accommodating of 
efficiency defenses, and less focus on per se rule prohibitions 
on cooperative agreements related to SMEs (Lee & 
Fukunaga, 2014; Gal, 2001, 2003). 
exclusions aimed at specific industries or activities. 
In this regard, hard law approach might not be 
flexible enough to allow these differences and 
might also be too costly for AMS because “the lack 
of substantive convergence in some areas of 
antitrust across jurisdictions (particularly but not 
exclusively in the area of monopolization) may 
suggest high costs for a binding commitment” 
(Niels and Kate, 2004). 
Consequently, ASEAN harmonized approach to 
competition law aims only at narrowing the 
distinctions between national laws while leaving 
variations of detail to national legislators. Thus, it 
is less than the uniform EU competition law and 
relies on the network model based on mutual 
assistance and cooperation. Given the diversity of 
AMS, this model seems suitable for ASEAN for the 
time being because as Frederic Jernny (2002) put 
it: “any solution to the general problem of 
promoting the complementarity of trade 
liberalization, regulatory reform (regional 
economic integration) and competition policy must 
be flexible enough to allow such national 
differences to continue to exist”. 
 
3. Key question of institutions 
a. EU institutions 
In the EU, the enforcement of international 
competition rules has been assigned to several 
supranational institutions, with the main one being 
the Commission, in particular the Directorate-
General (DG) for Competition. The Commission is 
the competition regulator for the single market 
possessing extensive investigative powers 
including requesting information from relevant 
parties, calling parties to oral interviews and 
conducting unannounced investigations at 
corporate as well as private premises. It makes 
decisions in the areas of antitrust (cartels and 
abuse of dominance), mergers and state aid. The 




organization of DG Competition is sector-specific, 
and covered all three areas of antitrust, mergers 
and state aid.19 DG Competition employs around 
745 relatively young staff with legal, economic, 
engineering and other backgrounds. It is allowed 
to impose fines amounting to a maximum of 10% 
of the overall annual turnover of entities found 
guilty of infringing competition law. Over the 
period 2005-2014, it has dealt with an average of 
305 mergers per year and it has made an average 
of 12 cartel and antitrust interventions per year. 
Thus, DG Competition offers great expertise and 
wields substantive power with regards to the 
functioning of the Single Market.20 Case-handlers 
of each unit face tight deadlines and work under 
the Head of unit and Deputy-Head of unit who are 
under the authority of the Director and are 
responsible for the management of the cases 
assigned to them and the other operational 
matters of the unit. Given the expertise and the 
sophisticated logistics of DG Competition, it is 
questionable whether this model would be 
replicable in the case of ASEAN. The overall EU 
bureaucracy is well-staffed and the European 
Commission itself employs 30 000 staff. In 
contrast, the ASEAN Secretariat only has 300 
professional staff.  The capacity of ASEAN 
Secretariat is further hampered by its meager 
financial resources. The 2014 budget of the whole 
ASEAN Secretariat is EUR 15.22 million, and this is 
in contrast to the EUR 142 billion allocated to the 
EU, with EUR 7.23 million just for the DG 
Competition. Budget and lack of qualified staff 
with technical skills are two instances that hinder 
                                                        




20  A case may be initiated in several ways: via a 
complaint from an aggrieved party/ MSs/ ordinary persons 
with a legitimate interest or of EC’s own accord. In case of 
mergers, the Commission mainly examines larger mergers 
with an EU dimension, which is determined by turnover 
thresholds. 
national competition authorities within ASEAN 
from fully exercising their mandate. Therefore, 
even if ASEAN decided to create a supranational 
entity in the future, there would be a risk of drain 
on human capital detrimental to domestic policy 
priorities, which is an important consideration 
especially for the less developed CLMV (Cambodia, 
Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam) countries. 
Two other EU institutions dealing with competition 
law are the General Court (EGC) and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). Following a decision taken by 
the DG Competition, parties may appeal the 
decision to the General Court of First Instance 
which may annul the decision, order a new 
investigation, or uphold the Commission’s 
decision. The parties or the Commission may 
appeal further to the ECJ of final instance, which 
may reverse the decision of the General Court (Luu 
2012). The ECJ is also competent to give 
preliminary rulings which are decisions on the 
interpretation of EU law, made at the request of a 
court or tribunal of an EU MS. 
Regulation 1/2003 also established a network of 
competition authorities called the European 
Competition Network (ECN). The latter is a 
mechanism for an optimal allocation of cases 
among the Commission and national competition 
authorities and sets rules for the exchange of 
information 21  as there is a decentralized 
arrangement for decision making and enforcement 
in the area of competition law and policy within 
the EU. This means that national competition 
authorities and courts have been empowered to 
apply European law, even in cases which have an 
effect outside the national border. This was part of 
the 2004 reform with the new Regulation 1/2003. 
                                                        
21  National competition authorities may share 
information, including confidential information, which may 
be needed to deal with cases related to Articles 101 or 102 of 
the TFEU. 




Under Article 15(1) of the modernization 
regulation, national courts may ask the 
Commission for information or for its opinion 
when it comes to the application of competition 
law and are expected to cooperate with the 
Commission and the competition authorities of the 
other MSs in order to promote uniform application 
of the competition rules. In addition, the 
Commission can also act on its own initiative (Art. 
15(3) of the Regulation). Thus, the Commission still 
plays a central role as it may intervene in local 
proceedings. At the same time it helps to 
strengthen the capacity of local competition 
institutions (authorities and courts). 
To sum up, EU MS have to follow the TFEU and 
therefore have to revise their own national law 
and policy in parallel to it. In order for the regional 
harmonization to be effective, there needs to be a 
strong domestic enforcement of competition law 
(Kunzlik, 2003), which is the case in the EU. This 
implies that if member states within the region do 
not strictly enforce competition law at a national 
level, even with a supranational decision-making 
authority, enforcement would be difficult as well. 
This would be the case in ASEAN, as national 
capacity and national will is all the more important 
for any enforcement of their competition laws. 
 
b. ASEAN institutions 
While the EU consists of a hybrid system of supra-
nationalism and inter-governmentalism and is 
sometimes considered as “perhaps the most 
‘legalized’ international institution in existence” 
(Alter, 2000), ASEAN still operates primarily by the 
‘ASEAN way’. The latter is based on decision-
making by consensus and non-interference in each 
other’s domestic affairs which often results in 
informal and non-binding agreements. Therefore, 
the EU built cooperation top-down, whereas 
ASEAN approaches issues horizontally and has just 
recently started to adopt a ‘consensus-based but 
not necessarily unanimity’ in certain areas of 
decision-making. 
Thus, ASEAN does not have any regional 
mechanisms such as DG Competition or the Court 
to implement or enforce competitions law. The 
ASEAN experts group on competition (AEGC), with 
the support of ASEAN Secretariat (which however 
does not have any powers to make decisions),22 
primarily focus on advocacy work and 
strengthening competition-related policy 
capabilities and best practices among AMS. It has 
organised various region-wide socialisation 
workshops in several AMS for government officials 
and the private sectors, intended to help foster a 
level playing field and raise awareness concerning 
fair business competition. Other activities 
promoted by AEGC include: capacity building and 
intra- and extra-regional networking. A multi-year 
program is currently being implemented in order 
to improve and enhance competition-related 
institutional building, legal framework and, 
advocacy and awareness for regional- and 
national-level in AMS. 
The necessity of a central regional entity similar to 
the European Commission which would supervise 
the promotion and protection of market 
competition and enforce competition law in ASEAN 
was underlined by Vu Ba Phu, Deputy Director 
General of the Vietnam Competition Authority and 
Deputy Chair of AEGC in 2009. However, there is 
no political will to develop such a supranational 
                                                        
22  “The ASEAN Secretariat's mission is to initiate, 
facilitate and coordinate ASEAN stakeholder collaboration in 
realizing the purposes and principles of ASEAN as reflected in 
the ASEAN Charter. The ASEAN Secretariat's basic function is 
to provide for greater efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN 
organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN 
projects and activities. “ Source: ASEAN Secretariat 
http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-
secretariat/about-asean-secretariat 




organization right now23 given the fact that ASEAN 
countries still hold a very traditional view on 
sovereignty. 
The ‘ASEAN way’ involves a high degree of 
informality, expediency, consensus-building and 
non-confrontational bargaining styles, 24  often 
contrasted with the formal bureaucratic structures 
and legalistic decision-making procedures in the 
EU (Acharya, 1997). AMS still remain very 
protective of their sovereignty, and reluctant to 
forego any part of it to a supranational institution.  
Following the guidelines, AMS may choose the way 
the national competition regulatory body will work 
(e.g. the establishment of one or multiple 
independent statutory authorities or the retention 
of regulatory body functions within the relevant 
Government Department or Ministry). The risk is a 
dispersion of power among different institutions. 
Moreover, ASEAN countries vary significantly in 
how effectively they enforce competition law. 
There are some newer regimes, such as in 
Singapore and Malaysia, which are being enforced 
rigorously while others are less effective. There are 
also some well-established regimes, such as 
Indonesia, which has shown a great interest in 
pursuing bid-rigging cases, but the weak 
Indonesian court system continues to undermine 
the effectiveness of the Indonesia Competition 
Commission (the KPPU).  
Furthermore, the development of competition law 
and its enforcement in some AMS may be slowed 
down by relationship-based systems rather than 
rules-based systems. In this matter, Mcwin (2014) 
argues that “In Thailand, the act has proved to be 
non-effective, partly due to the numerous 
exemptions accorded to state-owned companies 
                                                        
23  This lack of political will to create a central 
competition entity is implied in the guidelines. 
24  Even though there has been legalization with the 
ASEAN Charter (2007) which turned ASEAN into a legal 
entity. 
and, de facto, to companies own by influential 
individuals, as well as the lack of enforcement of 
the act due to pressure from big business and lack 
of concern by government.” He also highlights that 
from October 1999 until August 2013 there were 
18 complaints of abuse of a dominant position, 22 
restrictive agreements complaints and 52 unfair 
trade practices complaints, but there has not been 
a single successful prosecution. There have not 
been any merger complaints during this period, as 
the criteria for mergers had not been set. Similarly, 
according to Nikomborirak (2013), an absence of 
rules and regulations to ensure transparency 
makes enforcement in Thailand selective and 
arbitrary. 
Under these circumstances, it would be difficult to 
create a supranational regional competition 
regime at this stage. Therefore, harmonization of 
substantive national competition law together 
with the network model may be the most suitable 
to ASEAN’s ‘open regionalism’ infrastructure and 
its ‘ASEAN way’. 
 
4. What Next? 
a. Possible lessons from the EU? 
While recognizing that the supranational EU model 
of competition regime may not be entirely suitable 
for ASEAN, the EU’s experience in trying to create a 
more level playing field through harmonizing 
regulations or mutual recognition could offer some 
template for ASEAN’s own experimentation with a 
competition regime that can serve the region well. 
Currently, there are four main weaknesses in 
competition law and policy within ASEAN: (i) lack 
of an appropriate institutional framework, (ii) lack 
of an enforcement mechanism, (iii) governments’ 
unwillingness to let state enterprises be subject to 
same competition law, and (iv) asymmetries 
between consumer lobbies and business power 
(Briguglio, 2012). It is worth analyzing them in 




more detail as they seem instrumental for a well-
functioning competition law and policy. 
Regarding institutions and enforcement 
mechanism, as have already been discussed above, 
nine AMS have developed overarching competition 
acts, but contrary to the EU, ASEAN does not have 
a highly skilled competition directorate and a well-
developed judicial framework. Briguglio (2012) 
argues that successful competition law and policy 
that strengthens the common market requires a 
strong institutional framework. While creation of 
an efficient centralized entity with the power of 
enforcement is highly improbable for the time 
being, AMSs could seek inspiration in the European 
Competition Network. The latter significantly 
facilitates the work of national competition 
authorities on cross-border issues while promoting 
a culture of information-sharing. This could serve 
as an inspiration for deepening cooperation among 
competition authorities of different AMS.  
Apropos of exclusion from compliance by 
government authorities and state enterprises, 
according to the Article 106-1 TFEU, government 
authorities and state enterprises in the EU are 
subject to the same legal provisions as private 
undertakings. The logic behind is that public 
undertakings may negatively affect competition 
and thus the same legal provisions apply to private 
and public undertakings. There are some 
exceptions, for instance if the state undertaking is 
providing a service of general economic interest,25 
but the EC applies the case by case analysis in 
order to prevent abuses by public companies that 
may distort competition within the EU. However, 
according to Article 3.5.4 of the ASEAN 
Competition Guidelines, government authorities 
                                                        
25  Service of general economic interest (SGEI) consists 
of economic activities identified by public authorities as 
being of particular importance to citizens and that would not 
be supplied (or would be supplied under different conditions) 
if there were no public intervention (e.g. transport networks, 
postal services and social services). 
and state enterprises may not be considered as 
economic players to be constrained by competition 
law.26 This might contribute to the restriction of 
market access. 
Finally, Briguglio (2012) argues that ASEAN could 
learn from the EU that laws and regulations must 
be supported by strong advocacy and 
empowerment of civil society, which is not the 
case in all AMS, especially those with no or only 
recently created overarching competition act. Civil 
society is important as it can offer countervailing 
pressure to business interests. However, he 
observes that consumer groups tend not to be well 
organized in some AMS and the business milieu 
does not always incline towards competition 
culture because of vested interests, corruption, 
lack of transparency, or weak and non-
independent judicial system. The EU has promoted 
an ingrained competition culture and put in place 
strong enforcement arrangements to reduce 
possible business vested interest, such as leniency 
policy27 in the case of cartels. Within ASEAN, only 
two AMS (Singapore and Malaysia) have leniency 
provisions so far. Consequently, it is important to 
work on the advocacy and empowerment of civil 
society because as John Davies (Head, Competition 
Committee, OECD, Paris) highlighted: “The 2015 
deadline brings some formal convergence but 
success in catching and deterring cartels depends 
on so much more than just having a law.”  
 
b. Appropriate solutions for the near future 
of ASEAN competition law and policy? 
According to Luu (2012), ASEAN’s choice of a soft 
law approach with the guidelines and a networking 
                                                        
26  State and state-owned enterprises play a dominant 
role in ASEAN, and tend to enjoy monopoly powers often 
restricting market access. 
27  A policy whereby companies that provide 
information about a cartel in which they participated might 
receive full or partial immunity from fines. 




and co-operation process is appropriate for the 
time being. This is because ASEAN is constrained 
by the traditional ‘ASEAN way’, the diversity in 
economic conditions and competition regimes 
among AMSs, and “is still at a low level of 
integration with neither a supranational body nor a 
compulsory dispute resolution mechanism. These 
elements are considered, from the experiences of 
other regional arrangements, to be essential 
elements for the effectiveness of binding 
arrangements on competition law and policy”. This 
rational conclusion is applicable for the present 
state of affairs, as the AMS first need to develop 
their own systematic set of competition law and 
policy and enforcement procedures. However, can 
we expect more legalization in the area of 
competition law and policy in the future? 
First, AMS do not necessarily need to rely upon 
soft multilateral enforcement but could hybridize 
different approaches (hard and soft approach or 
bilateral and multilateral approach) which could be 
effective and could help lower transaction costs 
(Devahastin Na Ayudhaya, 2013). Waller (2003) 
points out that with the soft regional 
harmonization it may take longer time to 
cooperate effectively as states act upon national 
interest, which may include maintaining strong 
relationships with the domestic private sector. 
With the hybrid approach, an AMS could conclude 
a bilateral agreement with other members on 
certain private sectors that both have similar level 
of maturity, while also opt for the soft law 
approach at a regional level based on guidelines 
rather than formal rules and regulations 
(Devahastin Na Ayudhaya, 2013). 
In the short and medium term, AEGC, with the 
support of ASEAN Secretariat, will continue to play 
a crucial role in regional harmonization of 
competition law, not only by providing a 
framework through its publications but especially 
by organizing networking events. These allow 
representatives of different AMS to meet and 
exchange their views and practices and to adopt a 
more coordinated approach and push those who 
launched their competition regimes more recently.  
Such networking and cooperation efforts started 
with the establishment of the AEGC through 
conferences and annual meetings of the heads of 
the national competition authorities, but it seems 
important to intensify these meetings. Many 
speakers at the ‘ASEAN Antitrust: Issues and 
Challenges’ conference in April 2015 advocated 
enhanced cooperation between the national 
competition authorities in order to avoid 
unnecessary burden and uncertainty. In case of 
mergers, Herbert Fung (Director Business and 
Economics, Competition Commission of Singapore) 
explained that among 49 mergers notified to the 
national competition authority only 8 cases were 
purely local. With the increasing number of cross-
border transactions, competition authorities 
“would benefit from enhanced cooperation in 
terms of investigative efficiency and could reduce 
the substantive gaps and develop a mutual 
understanding of their legislations, share more 
information, and align the timing of merger 
control”.  
Furthermore, Ken Chia (Principal, Baker 
&McKenzie Wong & Leow, Singapore) emphasized 
that the principle of transparency should be 
further developed in AMS, as “there are many 
countries where the rules are not clear and would 
require further explanations by the national 
competition authorities”. While there is no ‘one-
size-fits-all’ solution for the design of competition 
authorities and their powers, as they depend on a 
country’s history and political, legal and economic 
systems, all competition regimes should have the 
following fundamental attributes: independence 
and accountability, fairness and credibility and 
transparency, safeguard for confidentiality and 
effective powers, influence and resources (Toh 




Han Li, Professor of Economics, New York 
University). However, the development of rules on 
transparency and their application may take some 
time in some AMS.28 
Much of what needs to be done in ASEAN depends 
on national political will and capacities. There are 
still many gaps that need to be filled. Working to 
close these gaps will take time, and in the long run, 
there is still the question whether ASEAN will be 
able and willing to follow the EU hard approach 
once there is more convergence and cooperation 
among AMS on the issue of competition law and 
policy. 
 
c. Is EU’s present ASEAN’s far future? 
Opinions have been raised that, in the long term, 
ASEAN may need a Regional Competition 
Committee to oversee and enforce competition 
law for cross-border cases and to coordinate 
across all national competition authorities in order 
to create one competitive region like the EU 
(Thanadsillapakul, 2010; Vu, 2009). The role of the 
AEGC could be expanded to become this 
Committee, which would be an initial step towards 
further development of common regional 
institutions designed to lead ASEAN to a higher 
degree of economic integration. 
Nevertheless, according to Severino (2015), ASEAN 
institutions can work well only if the nation states 
want them to and if they have their own well-
functioning institutions in order to implement the 
decisions effectively. Let us suppose that national 
competition authorities within ASEAN become well 
functioning in the future thanks to the efforts of 
AEGC and ASEAN Secretariat, then, the next step 
will be for ASEAN and national leaders to consider 
                                                        
28  In Thailand for instance, in a paper funded by the 
World Bank, S. Takasila and R. Chitmunchaitham found 
considerable conflict of interest problems among the 
commissioners (Mcewin, 2014). 
what AEC means for their countries and how much 
regional centralization and coordination is needed 
or desirable. Most probably a compromise will be 
needed so that AMS become willing to pool their 
sovereignty to create a central competition entity 
that could work in favor of making ASEAN an 
attractive investment area.  
In order to gain the trust of ASEAN leaders, the 
Regional Competition Committee may function as 
a kind of an ‘eminent persons group’ representing 
a “permanent body made up of former 
government officials, academics, and other highly 
respected ASEAN nationals, supported by a 
professional staff” (Inama & Sim, 2015), which 
would oversee and enforce competition law for 
cross-border cases, coordinate national 
competition authorities, and monitor and 
comment on AEC developments. Such a group has 
been frequently used in ASEAN’s history and the 
use of such groupings is in line with Southeast 
Asia’s largely agrarian system “whereby major 
decisions and disputes in the kampong (village) 
were resolved by consulting with the local elders” 
(Inama & Sim, 2015). Thus, decisions and analysis 
from this body could be more acceptable to AMS.  
In fact, the soft approach seems appropriate for 
the time being but may be insufficient in the long 
term. It seems that only by moving beyond the 
status quo can the full harmonization of the 
competition law and policy in ASEAN be achieved 
in the future. The Regional Competition 
Committee would not necessarily need to follow 
the example of the EC and DG Competition but 
could develop its own style adapted to the 
Southeast Asian context.  
According to Inama & Sim (2015), following this 
logic in its integration, ASEAN could establish a sui 
generis entity which would be “an economic 
integration model that blends selected aspects of 
the EU institutions with selected aspects of the 




NAFTA model.29 In this way ASEAN could chart its 
own course by creating an AEC that achieves a 
single production base, and ultimately a single 
market, but based on considerations of sovereignty 
and economic development which are appropriate 
for the region”. This might be seen as too 
ambitious at present but might not be impossible 
in the far future of ASEAN.   
 
Conclusion 
EU competition law regime is an effective and well-
functioning mechanism essential for the operation 
of the Single Market. There is much that ASEAN 
can learn from the EU experience as it proceeds 
tentatively toward deeper economic integration. 
However, how the EU competition law is derived 
cannot be a roadmap for ASEAN due to divergent 
regional, economic, political and legal factors. In 
addition, AMS are not yet fully willing, or ready, to 
forgo certain level of their sovereign rights in 
exchange for legal integration in this policy area. 
Therefore, the use of hard law approach with a 
single competition entity is not appropriate for the 
time being.  
In the future, when the constraints are overcome 
and strong domestic enforcement of competition 
law is put in place, further legalization in the area 
of ASEAN competition law will be welcome if more 
convergence is still needed. This could be done in 
several ways, such as by hybridizing hard and soft 
approach, bilateral and multilateral approach, and 
drawing from both the EU and NAFTA model and 
creating an ‘eminent persons group’ as a central 
competition entity.  
                                                        
29  NAFTA lacks the common (supranational) 
institutions of the EU and (except in certain narrowly defined 
areas) it also lacks the common competition rules present in 
the EU. These differences have grown as Regulation 1/2003 
has increased the uniformity of competition rules in the EU 
while NAFTA has not refined its competition rules. See Jones 
(2006). 
More time and financial and human resources may 
be needed for ASEAN to have a systematic 
harmonization of competition law. However, if it 
manages to do it successfully in a way that is the 
most appropriate for the region, the AEC could 
even serve as a role model for other developing 
nations facing similar concerns. 




Acharya, A. (1997). Ideas, identity, and institution-building: From the 'ASEAN way' to the 'Asia- Pacific 
way'? The Pacific Review, 10 (3), pp. 319-346. 
 
Allen & Gledhill (2015). Legal bulletin, August 2015. Available at: 
http://www.allenandgledhill.com/pages/publications.aspx?list=LBulletinAreas&pub_id=881&topic=Legal+
Bulletin+August+2015 [Accessed 3 September 2015]. 
 
Alter, K. J. (2000). The European Union’s Legal System and domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?   
International Organization, 54 (3), pp. 489-518. 
 
ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (2008). Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Available at: 
http://www.asean.org/archive/5187-10.pdf [Accessed 10 August 2015]. 
 
ASEAN Economic Community Chartbook (2013). Available at: 
http://www.asean.org/images/resources/Statistics/2014/AEC_Chartbook%202013.pdf  
[Accessed 10 August 2015]. 
 
ASEAN Regional guidelines on Competition policy (2010). Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat. Available at: 
http://www.asean.org/archive/publications/ASEANRegionalGudelinesonCompetitionPolicy.pdf [Accessed 
15 August 2015]. 
 
Borzel, T. A. (2015). Roundtable discussion: A Comparative Look at Crises and Responses in Asia and 
Europe. EU Centre in Singapore: October 2015. Conference report available at: 
http://www.eucentre.sg/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Lecture-Report_CrisesEuropeAsia.pdf [Accessed 10 
October 2015]. 
 
Briguglio, L. (2012). Competition Law and Policy in the European Union- some lessons for South East Asia. 
Paper presented at the 37th FAEA Annual Conference. Manila-Philippines. Available at: 
https://www.um.edu.mt/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/177163/ASEAN_competition_law_and_policy_of_th
e_EU_031102.pdf  [Accessed 25 August 2015]. 
 
Dabbah, M. M. (2010). International and Comparative Competition Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Devahastin Na Ayudhaya, P. (2013). ASEAN Harmonization of international competition law: what is the 
most efficient option? International Journal of Business, Economics and Law, 2(3). pp. 1-5. Available at: 
http://ijbel.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Asean-Harmonization-Of-International-Competition-Law-
%E2%80%93-What-Is-The-Most-Efficient-Option-Phanomkwan-Devahastin-Na-Ayudhaya.pdf [Accessed  2 
September 2015]. 
 




Eberhard, A. (2006). European Competition Law: A Critical Analysis of the Process Employed by the 
Commission to Assess Dominance under Article 82 EC. Hanse Law Review, 2 (2).Available at: 
http://www.hanselawreview.org/pdf4/Vol2No2Art05.pdf [Accessed 20 September 2015]. 
 
European Parliament (2014). ASEAN: building an Economic Community. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/542171/EPRS_ATA(2014)542171_REV1_EN.
pdf [Accessed 25 September 2015]. 
 
Gal, M.S. (2001). Size does matter: The effects of market size on optimal competition policy. University of 
Southern California Law Review, 74, pp. 1437-1478. 
 
Gal, M.S. (2003). Competition policy for small market economies. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
 
Geradin, D., Layne-Farrar, A., Petit, N. (2012). EU Competition Law and Economics, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Inama, S. and Sim, W. (2015). The Foundation of the ASEAN Economic Community, an Institutional and 
Legal Profile. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Jenny, F. (2002). "Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Convergence, Divergence and Co-
operation" in Chao, Y-Ch. et al. International and Comparative Competition Laws and Policies. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International. 
 
Jones, C.A.  (2006). Competition Dimensions of NAFTA and the European Union. Jean Monnet/ Robert 
Schuman Paper Series, 6 (17). Available at: http://www6.miami.edu/eucenter/JonesFinal.pdf [Accessed 2 
September 2015]. 
 
Kimura, F. (2013). Reconstructing the Concept of “Single Market and Production Base” for ASEAN beyond 
2015. ERIA discussion paper no. 2013-25. Jakarta: Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia. 
Available at: http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2013-25.pdf [Accessed 14 October 2015]. 
 
Kunzlik, P. F. (2003). Globalization and Hybridization in Antitrust Enforcement: European “Borrowings” 
From the U.S. Approach. Antitrust Bulletin, 48.  
 
Lee, C. and Fukunaga, Y. (2014). ASEAN regional cooperation on competition policy. Journal of Asian 
Economics, 35, pp. 77-91. 
 
Lloyd, P. J. (2007). “What Is a Single Market? An Application to the Case of ASEAN” in Wei-Yen, D. H. Brick 
by Brick: The Building of an ASEAN Economic Community. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. 
 
Luu, H. L. (2012). Regional Harmonization of Competition Law and Policy: An ASEAN Approach. Asian 
Journal of International Law, 2(2), pp. 291-321. 




Mcewin, R. I. (2014). Designing Competition Law under Financial Crisis- Indonesia and Thailand Compared. 
Competition Policy International, 10 (1), pp. 247-279. 
 
Nesadurai, H. E. S. (2005). “The Global Politics of Regionalism: Asia and the Asia-Pacific” in Farrell, M., 
Hettne, B. and Van Langenhove, L. Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice, London: Pluto Press. 
 
Nikomborirak, D. (2013). “The Political Economy of the Competition Regimes in Thailand and South Korea: 
A Comparison” in Lewis, D. Building New Competition Law Regimes: Selected Essays. Ottawa: International 
Development Research Centre. 
 
Plummer, M. G. (2009).  ASEAN Economic Integration; Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Finance, 
Advanced Research in Asian Economic Studies- Vol. 6. Singapore: World Scientific. 
 
Reyes, R. A. (2004). Forming a Single Market: Theory and Reality. Available at:  
http://www.asean.org/resources/publications/published-articles/item/forming-a-single-market-theory-
and-reality-romeo-a-reyes-2 [Accessed 14 October 2015]. 
 
Sabel, C. and Zeitlin, J. (2010). Experimentalist Governance in the European Union: Towards a New 
Architecture. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schwarze et al. (2008). Deficiencies in European Community Competition Law, Critical analysis of the 
current practice and proposals for change. Gleiss Lutz. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2008_regulation_1_2003/gleiss_lutz_en.pdf  
[Accessed 28 August 2015]. 
 
Severino, R. (2015). ASEAN: Expectations, myths and facts. Available at: http://www.aseannews.net/asean-
expectations-myths-and-facts/  
[Accessed 8 September 2015]. 
 
Thanadsillapakul, L. (2010). “The harmonization of ASEAN: competition laws and policy from an economic 
integration perspective” in Gugler, P. and Chaisse, J. Competitiveness of the ASEAN Countries, Corporate 
and Regulatory Drivers, Cheltenham: Edwar Elgar Publishing. 
 
The future of competition law and policy in the ASEAN countries: issues and challenges. Conference, 
Singapore: April 2015. Cited speakers:  John Davies, Herbert Fung, Ken Chia and Toh Han Li 
Available at: http://www.concurrences.com/Photos/fr-The-Future-of-Competition-Law/?lang=fr  [Accessed 
9 August 2015]. 
 
Tripathi, M. (2015). European Union and ASEAN: a comparison, International Journal of Research, 2(1). 
European Union. The History of the European Union. Available at:  http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-
history/index_en.htm  
[Accessed 21 August 2015]. 




Vu, B. P. (2009). Vision for an ASEAN competition regime. OECD, Bangkok Regional Forum. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/regional/searf2009/42712778.pdf [Accessed 7 August 2015]. 
 
Waller, S.W. (2003). Public Choice and the International Harmonization of Antitrust Law. Antitrust Bulletin, 
48. 
 
Wu, C-H. (2010). “The ASEAN Economic Community under the ASEAN Charter; Its External Economic 
Relations and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms” in Herrmann, Ch. And Terhechte, J. P. European Yearbook 
of International Economic Law 2010, Berlin: Springer. 
 
Yeo, L. H. (2015). Roundtable discussion: A Comparative Look at Crises and Responses in Asia and Europe. 
EU Centre in Singapore: October 2015. Conference report available at: http://www.eucentre.sg/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/Lecture-Report_CrisesEuropeAsia.pdf [Accessed 10 October 2015]. 
 
Zhao, S. (1998). Soft Versus Structured Regionalism: Organizational Forms Of Cooperation In Asia-Pacific.  
The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 12 (1), pp. 96-134. 









Established in 2008, the EU Centre in Singapore is a joint project of 
the European Union, the National University of Singapore (NUS), 
Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and the Singapore 
Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), and is part of a worldwide 
network of EU centres and EU institutes. We aim to promote 
knowledge and understanding of the EU and its impact on 
Singapore and the region, through activities revolving around 
outreach, education and research.  
 
As part of our public outreach activities, the Centre organises an 
ongoing series of talks, lectures and seminars. The Centre 
contributes to education and research on the EU through 
organising academic conferences and by publishing background 
briefs, working papers, and policy and research briefs.  
 
Copyright © 2015 EU Centre in Singapore  
 
www.eucentre.sg 
 
